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CHAPTER 4 I Playing Fair with Imprisonment 
RICHARD DAGGER 
Introduction 
This chapter rests on two assumptions, .at least one of which is contro-
versial.1 The first is that something is wrong when a society imprisons as 
many people as the United States now does. According to a widely pub-
lished columnist, George Will, the rate of imprisonment was about 100 
per 100,000 Americans until the 1970s. Since then the rate has shot up, to 
the point where "700 per 100,000" are now in prison; "America," Will re-
ported in 2013, "has nearly 5 percent of the world's population but almost 
25 percent of its prisoners."2 It is possible, of course, that these figures are 
just where they ought to be, or even too low. When a professed conserva-
tive such as Will takes them to be alarming, however, there seems little 
need to defend the assumption that something is amiss. 
The second assumption is that the principle of fair play underpins the 
justification of legal punishment. This assumption is clearly controversial, 
for only a few scholars nowadays justify punishment in terms of fair play. 3 
For present purposes, however, I shall simply point to the defenses I have 
offered elsewhere and respond to criticisms of the fair-play approach only 
in passing.4 In effect, I shall be presenting an oblique defense of this ap-
proach by demonstrating how it provides a helpful way of addressing the 
problem of excessive incarceration. In doing so, I shall also address the 
concern that democratic societies are especially prone to this problem be-
cause of their tendency to foster what has come to be known as penal 
populism. My argument is that democracy leads to mass imprisonment 
only when an otherwise democratic polity neglects what Albert Dzur calls 
the "moral dimension" of democracy: "Because citizens are lawgivers 
as well as law abiders, they have a special obligation in a republic to be 
vigilant to the possibility that their laws are unfairly burdening some over 
others, that their laws are exclusionary or discriminatory."5 Dzur makes 
no explicit reference to the principle of fair play here or elsewhere in his 
book, but I hope to show that the vigilance he calls for requires attention 
to that principle. 
Analyzing Excessive Incarceration 
From a purely analytical point of view, there seem to be four possible rea-
sons for excessive incarceration. These are: 
1. Too many people are committing crimes. 
2. Too many activities count as criminal. 
3. Too many criminals are imprisoned. 
4. Too many prisoners are imprisoned for too long. 
Any one of these reasons, or any combination of them, could account for 
overimprisonment, as a brief elaboration should make clear. 
First, there is a sense in which the statement "too many people are com-
mitting crimes" is self-evidently true: even one crime is a crime too many. 
If we proceed from some sense of what a normal or tolerable level of crime 
is, however, we can make realistic judgments of whether we have reason 
to worry that too many people are committing crimes. If such judgments 
are warranted, we then need to ask why so many are engaging in criminal 
activity, and one possibility is that some kind of social failure is at work. 
This could be a failure of prevention in the straightforward sense of not 
putting enough police on the streets, for example, or not training them 
properly. Or it could be a failure to cultivate the appropriate attitudes of 
respect for law and other persons through family discipline, civic educa-
tion, and other forms of socialization. Or it could be a failure to provide 
sufficient opportunities for people to live a decent life without resorting to 
crime. In any or all of these ways, a society may unwittingly contribute to 
the high crime rates that lead to high rates of incarceration. 
The second analytical possibility-and probably the one scholars most 
frequently cite-is that too many activities are classified as criminal. The 
leading example of this tendency "to criminalize too much and to punish 
too many," as Douglas Husak contends, is "the crime of illicit drug pos-
session."6 "Nearly one of every five prisoners in America," he notes, "is 
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behind bars for a nonviolent drug offense."7 Simply repealing the laws 
that make the possession of various drugs illicit would apparently lead to 
a significant drop in the rate of incarceration. But repealing such laws is 
not a simple matter. In addition to the problem of persuading legislators 
to take steps that may make them appear to be "soft on crime," there is 
the difficulty of determining exactly what the law ought and ought not to 
proscribe. This is a difficulty, though, that anyone who attributes mass in-
carceration to excessive criminalization must face. At the least, we should 
acknowledge that the spirit of fair play cannot countenance much harsher 
sentences for the possession of a relatively inexpensive drug, such as crack 
cocaine, than for its possession in purer and more expensive forms. 
To be sure, conviction of a criminal offense need not entail ~ prison 
sentence. There are alternatives, such as probation, community service, 
and restitution to the offender's victims.8 That is why the third possible 
reason for excessive incarceration is that too many criminals are im-
prisoned. Instead of locking up so many of them, perhaps we would do 
better to punish offenders in another way.9 Here, though, we face the dif-
ficulty of determining what kinds of crimes warrant what kinds of punitive 
responses-of how to make the punishment fit the crime, in the standard 
phrase. Hardly anyone would say that supervised community service is 
proper punishment for a serial killer or that a prison term is fitting for 
someone who steals an apple from a store (setting aside possible three-
strikes-and-you're out complications).10 There are plenty of hard cases 
between these extremes, however, and some principled means of sorting 
them out will be required if we are to reduce incarceration. 
Similar considerations bear on the fourth possibility. If we believe that 
excessive incarceration is largely the result of too many prisoners being im-
prisoned for too long, then we will need to find some way to determine the 
proper length of the sentences that attach to the various crimes warranting 
imprisonment. We will also need reasons for deciding whether determinate 
sentencing or mandatory-minimum sentences or three-strikes-and-you're-
out laws, all of which may boost the length of prison terms, are justified. 
We will need, in short, a theory of criminal law and punishment. 
Such a theory will not provide straightforward answers to every practi-
cal question that arises with regard to mass incarceration. No theory can 
tell us exactly how many days, months, or years is condign punishment 
for a certain criminal. Theories do provide necessary guidance, however, 
perhaps most notably by focusing our attention on a certain consideration, 
such as one or the other of those venerable rivals, deterrence or retribu-
tion, or by promising a harmonious blend of the two. In the remainder 
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of this chapter, I shall try to show how the principle of fair play provides 
such guidance. In particular, I shall try to show how it grounds a theory of 
criminal law and punishment that is broadly retributive, communicative, 
and sensitive to democratic considerations. This last point is important 
because of the previously mentioned worry that democracy, in the form of 
penal populism, is somehow to blame for mass incarceration. Indeed, all 
but the first of the four analytical possibilities I have traced may well stem 
from the popularity of "get tough" policies as responses to crime. 11 If so, 
then it will be necessary "to educate democracy," as Tocqueville said, in 
order to resolve the problem of mass incarceration. 12 Reinforcing the value 
of fair play is essential to this education. 
Crime, Punishment, and Fair Play 
As children are quick to learn, any activity that requires cooperation is 
likely to give rise to complaints of unfairness. Sometimes the complaint 
will be about the unfairness of those who do not do their part; at other 
times it will focus on the supposedly unfair distribution of the benefits 
that cooperation produces. In either case the core idea is that coopera-
tive activities provide benefits to the participants, with the benefits ranging 
from the pleasure of playing a game to those of sharing in the profits of a 
commercial enterprise or enjoying the protection afforded by a system of 
mutual defense. These benefits are not without costs, however, and those 
who participate in the activity are expected to bear a fair share of its bur-
dens. Punishment enters the picture because cooperative endeavors usu-
ally produce the desired benefits even if some of the participants shirk 
their responsibilities. To prevent these potential free riders from taking 
advantage of the cooperative efforts of others, the participants invoke the 
threat of punishment. When the threat is not successful, then actual pun-
ishment is justified because the offenders have violated the principle of 
fair play. 
For this account of fair play to provide a plausible theory of legal punish-
ment, we must be able to conceive of a polity as a cooperative enterprise-
in John Rawls's words, as "a fair system of cooperation over time, from one 
generation to the next."13 To some extent this is to conceive of the polity as 
an ideal, and some countries will fall so far short of the ideal that we cannot 
reasonably judge their oppressed and exploited subjects to be participants 
in cooperative practices that entail duties of fair play. To the extent that the 
rule of law is in force, however, we can hold that a country's people are 
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receiving the benefits of a cooperative enterprise and owe it to their fellow 
citizens to bear a fair share of the burdens of the enterprise-that is, to obey 
the law. 14 Everyone will find that obeying the law is at least occasionally 
burdensome, but good citizens wiJI not leave it to others to shoulder this 
burden while they ride free. To assure these citizens that their cooperative 
efforts will not be in vain, those who break the law should be punished. 
Much more needs to be said to fill out and defend this sketch of fair-
play theory, but I can touch on only two points here. One is that viola-
tions of the law are not equal in weight or character. There is a difference 
between civil and criminal disobedience, for instance, that any theory of 
punishment should recognize. There is also a significant difference be-
tween offenses that are straightforward failures to play fair, such as tax 
cheating, and crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery. Fair-play theory 
can acknowledge these differences, however, while insisting that every 
crime is in part a crime of unfairness-a failure to restrain one's conduct in 
ways necessary for the success of "a fair. system of cooperation over time, 
from one generation to the next." Although the severity of the punishment 
should match the gravity of the crime, it is the offense against fair play 
that justifies the legal authorities in administering the punishment. Some 
wrongs are wrongs regardless of what the law says, of course, and others 
are wrong only because the law says so. We need law and legal authorities 
to define and pronounce wrongs of both kinds, however, lest we face the 
"inconveniencies" of the state of nature, with its "irregular and uncertain 
exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of 
others,"15 or the hazards of a society riven by blood feuds and the private 
enforcement of unsettled norms. 
The second point to note is that fair-play theory is both retributive and 
communicative. It is retributive because punishment is a way of paying 
back those who do not play fair. Beyond retribution, fair play also calls 
for the communication of disapproval to the offender, in part as a way of 
reinforcing the importance to all participants of respecting the rules, but 
also in hopes of encouraging the offender to regret the wrong done and 
repair the damaged relationship with the law-abiding participants in the 
practice. 16 This is to say that fair-play theory not only has the backward-
looking aspect characteristic of retributive approaches to punishment, 
which insist that punishment should be imposed only on those who have 
broken the law; it also has a forward-looking aspect usually associated 
with consequentialist approaches. That is, fair-play theory holds that pun-
ishment must serve to maintain the polity as a fair system of cooperation 
under law-or, more likely, to move the polity closer to that ideal. 
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That is a point to be elaborated shortly. First, though, it will be useful to 
apply this sketch of the argument from fair play to the four analytical con-
siderations set out in the previous section. In doing so, I will be relying on 
the example of fair play in sports. Whether games and sports are suitably 
analogous to politics and law is a topic I tum to in the following section. 
Regarding the first consideration-that is, the possibility that too many 
crimes are being committed-the straightforward application of the prin-
ciple of fair play suggests that crimes are like violations of the rules of a 
game. If we find that the play of the game is suffering because too many 
players are in the penalty box, or suspended, or outright expelled from 
the sport, then we may want to know why so many players are opening 
themselves to sanctions-and jeopardizing the sport as a whole-by vio-
lating the rules. If it seems that they are simply cheating in order to gain 
an unfair advantage for themselves by free-riding on the cooperative ef-
forts of others, then we will need to take the kinds of preventive steps 
I mentioned earlier-that is, stepped-up policing of the game and efforts 
to cultivate the sense of sportsmanship or fair play on which the game 
depends. 17 But we should also consider whether there may be something 
wrong with the rules themselves. There may be some rule, for example, 
that works systematically to the advantage of some players or teams, and 
the disadvantage of others, but is not important to the game itself. A case 
in point could be a game in which the players must equip themselves and 
only the wealthy can afford the most advanced equipment, thus giving 
them a significant advantage while playing. If we find that violations of 
the rules increase because less affluent players or teams are trying to com-
pensate for their disadvantage, we should consider whether a change in the 
rules regarding equipment may be in order. Fair play is largely a matter of 
respecting the rules, to be sure, but we should not overlook the possibility 
that rules may be more or less encouraging of fair play. 
In the case of the second analytical consideration, we may think of the 
possibility that too many activities are counted as criminal by way of an 
analogy with a sport that imposes too many rules on its players. Sports 
leagues and associations typically regulate the kind of clothing and gear 
players may wear, for example, and they do so in some cases for reasons 
closely related to the play of the game itself-not allowing football play-
ers to wear clothing studded with metal spikes or baseball pitchers to wear 
mirrors that reflect light into the batters' eyes-and in other cases for rea-
sons that have little or no bearing on its play. Some clothing regulations 
aim at insuring that players project what the league officials think is the 
proper image; others ban clothing that advertises a product not approved 
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by, or contributing to the coffers of, the league. Players who break these 
rules have been penalized in various ways for their activities, even though 
the activities seem to have no bearing on the play of the game. Is this fair? 
Are the nonconformist players taking unfair advantage of the players who 
conform to the regulations? Or would the sport benefit if rules that are not 
truly necessary to the play of the game were eliminated? Is it possible that 
an excess of rules-especially rules that seem petty, trivial, or pointless-
will in fact undermine the sport by leading players to lose respect for the 
rules of the game? If the answer to these last two questions is "yes," then 
the rules in question should be abolished. 18 
What of the third analytical consideration-that is, the possibility that 
too many criminals are being imprisoned? In this case the analogy with a 
game raises questions about the severity of offenses and penalties. There 
are many offenses that occur inadvertently in the course of play, usually 
called "fouls," and in some cases players are allowed to accumulate fouls 
until they reach a set number, at which_point they have "fouled out" and 
are expelled from the game. But some fouls are considered worse than 
others, such as intentional fouls, and some intentional fouls__:flagrant 
fouls, in particular-may be cause for immediate ejection from the game 
and perhaps suspension from future games. There are also offenses against 
the referees, umpires, and officials who supervise the play of the game 
to make sure that the rules are followed--0ffenses that can pose a direct 
threat to fair play. It is no surprise, then, that those who govern sports 
leagues and associations devote considerable attention to determining the 
appropriate penalties for the various offenses that arise in the course of 
play. Nor is it surprising that the gauge they typically employ is the ten-
dency of the penalty to assure the fair play of the game. 
This same point carries over to the final consideration, which is that 
too many prisoners may be imprisoned for too long. In the case of sports, 
the question is not only whether some rule breakers are treated unfairly 
but also whether they are punished too severely for the good of the sport 
itself. Gambling presents a case in point. Both players and spectators need 
to believe in the fair play of the game, but it is difficult to sustain that 
belief when there are reasonable suspicions of "point shaving" or attempts 
to "throw"-that is, deliberately lose-a game or match in exchange for 
money from gamblers. As a result, sports organizations typically have rules 
that limit the gambling of those involved in the sport, or even prohibit con-
tact with gamblers. Violations of these rules have led to suspensions for 
lengthy periods, even to the point of banishment for life. The result may 
be to promote confidence in the fair play of the game, but there also may 
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be reason to question the justice of the sanctions imposed on people who 
may have failed to understand or appreciate what they were doing-as in 
the case of "Shoeless Joe" Jackson of baseball's notorious Chicago "Black 
Sox" Scandal of 1919. There are also reasons to question the wisdom, 
and fairness, of penalties that remove excellent players from competition. 
Surely those who grievously violate the rules deserve punishment; that is 
the retributive aspect of fair play. But they should be punished in a way, 
and to an extent, that holds the promise of restoring the offenders, when 
possible, to the status of full participants in the game. That is part of the 
communicative aspect of fair play. 
This last point suggests a direct connection to one controversial ques-
tion about what constitutes fair or unfair treatment of criminal offenders. 
I refer here to the question of whether convicted felons should lose their 
voting rights while serving their sentences, and perhaps even forever. Fair-
play theorists may differ on the justice of disenfranchising felons while 
they are in prison, but they will hold that fairness requires the restora-
tion of voting rights to those who have served their time. Again, this is 
in keeping with the communicative aspect of fair-play theory. Those who 
have paid their debts to society-and presumably learned to appreciate the 
importance of respecting the rule of law-should be restored to full citi-
zenship in the polity. I return to this point below, when I defend disenfran-
chisement while imprisoned as an appropriate form of civic punishment. 
This one example, however, is hardly typical of what the fair-play ap-
proach to the four analytical considerations reveals. In most cases, the 
principle of fair play does not supply a clear and distinct answer to the 
questions that follow from these considerations. But it does provide a uni-
fied approach to these questions that concentrates on the need to establish 
and enforce rules, and punish those who break them, in order to secure 
the fair play of the game. This still leaves us, though, with the question of 
whether this approach has any real bearing on law and punishment in the 
world beyond the sports arena. 
Fair Play and the Polity 
The question, in short, is whether the analogy between games and legal 
systems is sound. After all, one might object, the polity is not a game. 
The kinds of games I have been discussing take place within the larger 
framework of a legal order, which means that the legal order cannot be un-
derstood simply as a game itself. If someone playing ice hockey stabs an 
opponent with a knife, he has certainly failed to play fair; but we will not 
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be content with sending him to the penalty box or even expelling him from 
the game. Justice requires a legal response in this case, not one governed 
by the rules of hockey. Moreover, the paradigm cases of crime-assault, 
robbery, rape, murder-are not simply violations of the rules or failures of 
fair play. To think of them as analogous to cheating in a game is to misun-
derstand them altogether. 19 
These are serious objections. Before responding to them directly, 
though, it is important to note the ways in which the analogy is illuminat-
ing. One way is that respect for the rules is vital to both the play of a game 
and the survival of a polity. There may be political and legal systems in 
which brute force seems to be the prevailing cause of obedience, but even 
tyrants rely on some degree of respect for their authority. Besides, in any 
system that professes to follow the rule of law, respect for the rules them-
selves is necessary. They need not be regarded as sacred or immutable, but 
neither should the citizens dismiss the rules out of hand as nothing more 
than arbitrary commands or regulations. ·When laws encourage that kind of 
attitude, they stand in need of reform. 
A second strength of the analogy between games and legal systems 
is that the communicative aspect of rules and rule enforcement is vital 
to both. Laws are guides to conduct, and they cannot serve that purpose 
if they are not communicated to the people whose conduct they are sup-
posed to guide. That is why Thomas Aquinas included promulgation 
among the defining features of law.20 Punishment, too, serves a com-
municative function, as I have noted. So much is as true of polities as 
it is of games. 
A third point of analogy-and one with particular significance for 
democratic theory-is that both games and legal systems rely on the ideal 
of equality. In competitive games, we do not expect that the competitors 
always will be equally matched. We do want them to have an equal chance 
to display their talents, however, as the familiar metaphor of the level play-
ing field attests. The same is true within legal systems, where the ideal is 
for everyone to be equal before (or in the eyes of) the law. In neither games 
nor legal systems is the ideal always achieved, to be sure, and in some 
cases the actuality is a travesty of the ideal. But we can only recognize it 
as a travesty if we have the ideal to animate and inspire us. 
These points connect to the principle of fair play in two ways. First, 
they represent aspects of that principle. To play fair is to treat partici-
pants as equally worthy of respect qua participants in a cooperative, rule-
govemed enterprise and to communicate to them both what the rules are 
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and the consequences of violating them. Second, the three points of anal-
ogy indicate the public aspect of fair play. Rules and laws are matters 
of public concern. They cannot guide conduct and contribute to the play 
of the game, or the good order of a polity, if they are not made public. 
Furthermore, they benefit from being made publicly-a point I return to in 
the conclusion to this chapter. 
But what of the two objections to the analogy on which fair-play theory 
rests that I mentioned earlier? The short answer-I have offered longer 
ones elsewhere21-is that the analogy need not be exact. It is true that the 
political and legal system must be larger and more encompassing than any 
of the games that take place within its boundaries. But that means that we 
should think of the polity as a special kind of game-that is, as a super- or 
meta-game that encompasses and governs other games and activities. It 
is a cooperative practice nevertheless, even though we may occasionally 
need to think of it as a meta-practice that is a necessarily public matter.22 
The second point in defense of the analogy has to do with the nature 
of crime. Some crimes, according to the objection, are indeed violations 
of fair play. Tax evasion is a standard example, and some would include 
mala prohibita offenses in general.23 For mala in se offenses, however, 
considerations of fair play are simply beside the point. My short answer is 
to concede that fair play does not capture the full wrongfulness of murder, 
rape, robbery, and assault, but to insist that it need not do so. What fair 
play does is to justify the legal punishment of the wrongdoers, whose 
actions not only injure their specific victims but threaten the cooperative 
order in general. That is why punishment is in the hands of "the authori-
ties." Moreover, considerations of fair play can also help us to understand 
how some failures to play fair are more serious than others. The basket-
ball player who intentionally fouls an opponent deserves a penalty; the 
player who flagrantly fouls an opponent deserves a harsher penalty; the 
player who pulls a gun on an opponent deserves not only an extremely 
harsh penalty from the game's officials but also punishment under the 
laws of the meta-practice. There is a violation of fair play in each in-
stance, but the violation is progressively more serious in the latter two 
instances because the offender acts in such a way as to make it difficult 
or impossible for his opponent to continue to participate in the game-or 
even in the meta-practice of which the game is a part. Fair play may not 
tell us everything we need to know about an offense, but it tells us enough 
to justify legal punishment and to give us some sense of why some crimes 
are worse than others. 
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Democracy, Fair Play, and Imprisonment 
What, though, does this talk of games and fair play have to do with the 
topics of this volume, democratic theory and excessive incarceration? One 
answer is that fair-play considerations help to explain why we are right to 
worry about the rates of imprisonment in the United States, and perhaps 
elsewhere, these days. For we have reason to believe that we are falling 
short of the standards implicit in the principle of fair play. When rates of 
incarceration are as high as they have been recently, we must ask how 
reasonable it is to regard the United States as a cooperative practice. Fair-
play theory contains critical and aspirational elements, in other words, that 
point toward an ideal of a fully fair practice and demand attention to the 
ways in which a practice, including the meta-practice of the polity, falls 
short of that ideal. Mass incarceration is evidence that there is much to 
criticize in the current practice of criminal law in the United States. 
Such criticism should lead us back .to the four analytical possibilities 
I raised earlier. My claim is that fair play can help us to formulate re-
sponses to the problems that arise in all four cases. Are too many crimes 
being committed? Yes, certainly, but it is far from clearthat spending more 
money on policing is the only answer. More needs to be done to encourage 
potential offenders to play fair by obeying the law and to provide them 
with opportunities to participate more fully, and fairly, in their society. 
Before we punish someone, as the philosopher T. H. Green long ago re-
marked, we should be sure that "the social organization in which a crimi-
nal has lived and acted is one that has given him a fair chance of not being 
a criminal."24 Among other things, steps should be taken to reduce recidi-
vism; for if it is true that too many crimes are being committed, it is also 
true that the same people are committing many of them. From the stand-
point of fair-play theory, a particularly promising effort to reduce recidi-
vism is the "social enterprise approach" sponsored in the United Kingdom 
by the Royal Society for the Arts, which aims to engage prisoners in paid 
work for social enterprises while they are in custody, then to continue their 
employment in a supervised Transition Zone before their full release into 
society.25 
What of the other analytical considerations? Are too many activities 
classified as criminal? Yes, certainly, to the point where the criminaliza-
tion of activities that do not amount to violations of fair play is probably 
undermining respect for law. Laws against gambling are a case in point, 
and especially so when they exist alongside state-sponsored lotteries. If 
we want to discourage people from risking their money on wagers, we 
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should rely on education rather than coercion-and avoid the hypocrisy 
of encouraging them to take their chances in public lotteries all the while. 
Hypocrisy and unfairness also come quickly to mind with regard to drug 
laws, and their highly unequal enforcement, in the United States.26 
Are too many convicted criminals imprisoned, as the third consideration 
asks? Yes, because there are other forms of punishment that are likely to 
do more to help criminals comprehend the cooperative nature of society 
and their duties of fair play. Community service is especially worthy of 
consideration, as is service that can provide some restitution to the par-
ticular victims of an offender's crimes.27 And finally, are too many prison-
ers imprisoned for too long? Yes again, because of mandatory-minimum 
sentences and laws such as three strikes that do little or nothing to restore 
criminals to the status of law-abiding citizens-and less than nothing to 
promote fairness in the form of keeping the punishment in proportion to 
the offense. There is more, obviously, to be said to clarify and defend 
every one of these responses, but the point for now is that fair play pro-
vides the orientation we need as we work toward the answers. 
This orientation is complementary, moreover, to democratic theory. 
Worries about penal populism have some basis in fact, in my view, but 
only to the extent that a society is democratic in a simplistic and perhaps 
corrupt way. On the simplistic view, democracy is merely a matter of ma-
jority rule, no matter how majority opinion is formed or what course it 
takes. Taking this view to its extreme, today's majority could vote to deny 
the franchise henceforward to those in today's minority, or even to enslave 
them. No democratic theorist endorses this simplistic view, however, be-
cause it fails to respect the fundamental democratic commitment to equal-
ity, here understood as a right to the equal consideration of everyone's 
interests.28 If the problem of mass incarceration is in large part the result 
of penal populism, it is because those who make the laws are playing to 
an audience that is insufficiently concerned with equal consideration-
and therefore with playing fair. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to 
speak of the corruption of democracy. 
A well-functioning democracy, in contrast, is a cooperative enterprise. 
It must have rules, and it must have means of dealing with those who break 
the rules, including punishment. But the rules must be fair and so must 
the punishment. One sign of their fairness is that they must aim to do only 
what is necessary to secure and strengthen the cooperative enterprise. That 
means, among other things, that punishment must proceed in a manner 
that is likely to restore the offenders to full participation in the democracy. 
Those who have paid their debts to society by undergoing punishment that 
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communicates to them and their fellow citizens the importance of abiding 
by the laws of a cooperative society ought to be able to regain the status of 
full citizenship. Mass incarceration and high rates of recidivism are signs 
that democracy in the United States is not proceeding in this manner-and 
is not, therefore, the cooperative practice it ought to be. 
This claim turns on a distinction between two conceptions of democ-
racy. One is the conception on which I have been drawing, which takes de-
mocracy to be a cooperative venture aiming to realize a common good; the 
other conception, and perhaps the more familiar and apparently realistic 
one, takes democracy to be a kind of machine for aggregating the personal 
preferences of the populace. The two conceptions share a commitment to 
equality and fairness, but what counts as fairness differs from one concep-
tion to the other; and only the first generates a sense of fair play robust 
enough to make clear the undemocratic character of mass incarceration. 
The preference-aggregation conception of democracy is well known 
from the writings of Joseph Schumpeter a.nd others who draw an analogy 
between economic and electoral competition.29 As they see it, individual 
citizens bring their preferences into the political arena in much the same 
way that consumers enter the economic marketplace, with the primary 
difference being the kind of currency in use. Otherwise, candidates and 
parties compete for the voter's attention and support much as producers 
of goods compete for the consumer's money. Once in office, successful 
candidates do what they can to satisfy those who voted for them and to 
attract new supporters whenever possible, all in the hope of being returned 
to office at the next election. Not every voter wins, of course, in the sense 
of seeing her preferred candidates elected to office; but everyone eligible 
to vote at least has a chance to register her preferences, which the political 
system aggregates first by way of electoral results and second by way of 
the policies and laws enacted by those who win office. 
What makes this preference-aggregation view a conception of democ-
racy is its commitment to regarding everyone's preferences equally. You 
may care enough to go to the polls and vote while I do not, but your vote 
would count for no more than mine were I to cast one. Besides, my failure 
to vote is itself a statement of my preferences: you prefer voting to other 
activities available at the time, but I prefer other activities to voting. To be 
sure, you may exercise more influence over the outcome than I do even 
if I cast my vote, but that is probably because you expend more of your 
other resources-time, persuasive power, and perhaps money-than I do 
in the attempt to influence how others vote. So far as votes themselves are 
concerned, in a majority-rule system you and I are equal not only to each 
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other but to every other potential voter.30 In that sense, the preference-
aggregation conception is clearly democratic. 
It also reflects a sense of fairness. Just as fraud, theft, collusion, and 
other violations of fair competition in the economic marketplace must be 
guarded against, so must electoral fraud and political corruption. If the 
system is to aggregate personal preferences in a way that treats everyone 
equally, then someone will have to hold the authority to proscribe cheating 
and to punish those who do not play fair. Fair play in politics thus requires 
neutral officials to ensure that the competition takes place on the equiva-
lent of a level playing field. Political competition shares this reliance on 
fair play with competition in both the marketplace and the sporting field. 
What, then, are the implications of this preference-aggregation con-
ception of democracy for the understanding of mass incarceration? The 
answer turns entirely on the preferences of the voters. Whether rates of 
incarceration are or are not excessive, according to this conception, will 
depend upon what the voters hope to accomplish by imprisoning offend-
ers. Economic considerations surely will come into play here, for anyone 
who believes that prisons are necessary or desirable responses to crime 
will want them to operate efficiently. Other things being equal, the voters 
will prefer not to go to the extra expense of building more prisons to ac-
commodate more prisoners. But they may also decide that the perceived 
gains in personal safety or the satisfaction of exacting retribution are worth 
the extra expense. These preferences may well lead them to vote for pol-
iticians who continue to insist on the tough-on-crime policies that lead 
to mass incarceration. Penal populism is thus fully at home within the 
preference-aggregation conception of democracy. 
Taking democracy to be a cooperative venture in pursuit of a common 
good, however, produces a much different result. On this conception, 
the voter is expected to act as a citizen rather than a consumer, and de-
mocracy is less a matter of eliciting personal preferences than of evok-
ing civic judgments. The two considerations, however, are not mutually 
exclusive. Like the preference-aggregation conception, the cooperative-
venture understanding of democracy holds that everyone's interests are 
to be accorded equal consideration, and every member of the polity 
should have opportunities to express his preferences. But the cooper-
ative-venture conception also holds that citizens should look beyond 
their personal preferences to what is good or best for the polity as a 
whole. This conception thus accords with the belief that every citizen 
holds office or, as John Stuart Mill put the point, stands in a position of 
public trust. 31 
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Both conceptions share, as I have noted, a commitment not only to 
equality but to fairness. On either conception, democracy requires electoral 
competition, and that competition must proceed in accordance with regu-
lations that ensure the fair conduct of elections. However, the cooperative-
venture conception does not stop at this point; for competition itself must 
be understood as an element of what is a fundamentally cooperative en-
terprise. We may be tempted to think of competition in the marketplace or 
the sporting arena as a matter of winning at all costs, but it is nevertheless 
true that unbounded competition will lead to the destruction of both the 
market and the sport. If all that matters is winning, then there is no reason 
not to cheat and steal at every opportunity, and even to dispense with those 
whose office is to protect personal property or to uphold the rules of the 
game. In such cases, though, property rights will count for nothing and 
the game will no longer be recognizable as baseball or cricket or football. 
In such cases, both markets and sports will degenerate into something re-
sembling Hobbes's state of nature. To av<?id this outcome, the participants 
must find ways to underpin their competition with a cooperative commit-
ment to playing fair-a commitment that includes the appointment of of-
ficials whose duty is to elaborate and enforce the rules of fair play. 
This cooperative commitment also includes a commitment to regard 
the other participants as contributors to a common enterprise. We have 
a duty to treat them fairly, therefore, and encourage reciprocity on their 
parts. In a democracy, according to the cooperative-venture conception, 
there is a corresponding duty to regard every member of the polity as a 
potential contributor to the cooperative enterprise of self-government. 
There is also a duty to encourage reciprocity and to promote the virtues 
of citizenship among the members. In Rawls's terms this is "a natural 
duty of civility," which requires citizens, among other things, "not to 
invoke the faults of social arrangements as a too ready excuse for not 
complying with them, nor to exploit inevitable loopholes in the rules to 
advance our interests."32 In order to sustain the cooperative enterprise, in 
other words, we must play fair even when personal advantage would have 
us do otherwise. Because we cannot count on everyone always to play fair, 
we need the police and judges and other officials to provide the security 
necessary to assure those who are willing to abide by the rules that their 
cooperative efforts will not be wasted. But we also need to do what we can 
to promote Rawls's natural duty of civility. Other things being equal, will-
ing cooperation is better than coerced. 
Another implication of the cooperative-venture conception of democ-
racy has to do with the rules that govern the enterprise. In a democracy, 
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these rules are themselves a matter of public choice, and the duty of ci-
vility extends to the framing of these rules. Before we enact a law, then, 
we must be sure that it is a law that does not impose an unfair burden on 
other members of the polity. In the context of this chapter, this means that 
we must determine what is to count as a crime in this light. The answer 
is clear enough in the standard cases of assault, murder, rape, and rob-
bery, for we do not impose unfair burdens on our fellow citizens when 
we proscribe those actions. Indeed, the unfair burdens would fall on the 
victims of those crimes, whose suffering would make it difficult, at best, to 
continue to play the part of the cooperative citizen. There are many other 
activities, however, that democratically elected legislatures have outlawed 
even though these activities fall outside the standard cases. Whether they 
should or should not be outlawed is a matter to decide, on the cooperative-
venture conception of democracy, in light of their bearing on fair play and 
civility. Some of these cases should be easy to settle. Suborning witnesses 
and threatening judges are actions that strike at the rule of law, and any 
burden that anyone suffers as a result of their proscription is hardly an 
unfair burden. Mala prohibita offenses, such as those involving traffic and 
environmental regulations, are likely to be justified as a means of ensur-
ing cooperation in a collective enterprise; but if it becomes clear that the 
proscription in question places an unfair burden on some members of the 
polity, then either the proscription should be altered or the activity in ques-
tion should be allowed. 
From the standpoint of the cooperative-venture conception, in short, the 
question is not whether the aggregated preferences of the people, either 
directly or through their elected representatives, should or should not des-
ignate a certain activity as criminal. The question, instead, is whether the 
activity in question inhibits the fair play of the democratic game. If it does, 
then the question becomes one of efficacy-in other words, whether the 
criminal sanction is the best way to deal with those actions that interfere 
with democratic fair play or whether there are better alternatives. If the 
activity in question poses no threat to democratic fair play, then it should 
not be proscribed. In some cases this approach leads to straightforward 
decisions. For instance, anyone who proposes to make a crime of some 
form of sexual activity between consenting adults would have to show that 
the activity in question poses a serious threat to democracy understood as 
a cooperative venture, and that will be a difficult case to make. In many 
cases, though, the decision will not be at all straightforward. One could 
argue, for instance, that the production or consumption of any drug that 
renders people incapable of fair play or of carrying out their duties of 
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civility should be a crime. Couched in those terms, the proposal is per-
fectly acceptable under the cooperative-venture conception of democracy. 
But those who are charged with determining what is to count as a crime 
would then have to make an informed judgment as to which drugs, if any, 
do in fact have those antidemocratic and unfair propensities. Once they 
have identified such drugs, if any, they would then have to make the further 
determination of whether the criminal sanction is the appropriate way to 
deal with the problem and, if it is, whether a blanket prohibition or a more 
limited response is better. In the case of alcohol, there is little doubt that 
its consumption at some point inhibits civility and the sense of fair play. 
Laws against public drunkenness and enhanced punishment for those who 
harm or endanger others while drunk, though, seem likely to address the 
problem more effectively than outright prohibition of the production, sale, 
or consumption of alcohol. Nor would such laws place an unfair burden on 
anyone, such as those who consume alcohol without endangering anyone 
or threatening democratic fair play. Exte~ding this reasoning to drugs that 
are widely proscribed at present would almost certainly result in a dra-
matic reduction of drug crimes and a similar reduction in the prison popu-
lation. Such a change by itself would not be enough to solve the problem 
of mass incarceration in the United States, but it surely would be a major 
step in that direction. 
In this way the conception of democracy as a cooperative venture re-
inforces my earlier point about the connection between fair play and the 
reduction of the number of actions and activities that should be desig-
nated criminal. The conception also speaks to the concern that too many 
criminals are being imprisoned and too many are being imprisoned for 
too long. If the polity is a cooperative venture, then it is perfectly rea-
sonable to discourage its members from engaging in actions that harm 
those whose law-abiding conduct sustain the venture or otherwise threaten 
to undermine it. It is also reasonable to punish those who have, despite 
the discouragement, committed such acts. Except in extraordinary cases, 
however, the aim should be to restore the offenders to full participation 
in the democratic venture, not to banish them forever. Again, there will 
be difficult judgments to make about whether imprisonment is the proper 
sentence for certain offenses and, if it is, how long the term should be. 
Even so, there is little doubt that the lengthy sentences that have contrib-
uted to the explosion of the prison population in the United States cannot 
be justified under the cooperative-venture conception of democracy. Such 
sentences unfairly burden those on whom they are imposed, and they do 
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nothing to restore the offender to a place in society as a full participant in 
the cooperative venture. 
With that point in mind, I return briefly to the controversy over the 
disenfranchisement of felons. 33 One issue here concerns whether impris-
onment for a criminal offense should ever carry with it the loss of the 
offender's vote. In my view, as I stated earlier, it should. There are some 
cases-treason, electoral fraud, and attempting to bribe officers of the law 
are clear examples-in which loss of the vote seems appropriate because 
the offender has directly threatened the cooperative venture of the polity. 
But depriving the offender of the franchise is also fitting in the case of 
any offense serious enough to be considered a felony. Even if the offense 
is arson or burglary or some other crime that has no direct bearing on the 
conduct of elections or the functions of the government, it nevertheless 
constitutes a significant violation of fair play and civility. In addition to 
his imprisonment, then, the criminal should suffer a loss of status. He has 
breached a civic trust, and it is only fair that he surrender his vote as a 
result. This is not to say that the convicted criminal should be treated as 
an outcast who is altogether excluded from the polity. But neither should 
he be regarded as a member in good standing. In keeping with the com-
municative aspect of punishment, this diminution of his civic status should 
be reflected in the temporary loss of a fundamental civic or political right. 
Once again, however, the aim should be to restore him to full participation 
in the democratic venture, which entails the restoration of the franchise 
when he has completed his sentence. To do otherwise would be to impose 
an unfair burden on him while doing nothing to promote the spirit of dem-
ocratic fair play among others.34 
Fair Play and the Educated Democracy 
Earlier in this chapter I quoted Tocqueville's remark, in his introduction to 
the first volume of Democracy in America, that it is necessary to educate 
democracy. By this Tocqueville meant that, if we are to live in a society 
governed by the common people-as he thought was inevitable-then 
it behooves the leaders of society to take measures that will prepare the 
people to govern democratically. Put simply, this education must comprise 
not only the standard subjects taught in schoolhouses but also education 
in the responsibilities of democratic citizenship. For this latter sort of edu-
cation, the schoolhouse would be insufficient. Other venues, such as the 
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town meeting and the courthouse, where citizens would sit in jury duty, 
would help to complete this education in democracy. 35 
Another way to put Tocqueville's point is to say that democracy is 
a matter of self-government in two senses of that word. It is, first, self-
government in the sense that the people rule. But this is not to be the kind 
of rule in which the people, as a collective, simply do whatever they please, 
so that democracy becomes the tyranny of the majority that Tocqueville 
feared. It must also be self-government in the sense that the people govern 
themselves-that is, exercise self-restraint-in a thoughtful, prudent 
manner. In the terms of this chapter, that self-restraint, or self-government, 
is largely a matter of respecting the rule of law-laws that are to be made 
publicly, to serve the public good-and the principle of fair play. But that 
is not to say that self-government is a kind of altruism. Every citizen has 
a right to care for her own interests and to demand equal consideration of 
those interests from her fellows. That much the cooperative-venture con-
ception of democracy shares with the p~eference-aggregation model. But 
equality of consideration requires her to extend this same consideration to 
all of the others. When she votes or otherwise contributes to the making 
of laws and policies, then, the citizen is to do so in a way that accords this 
equal respect to all citizens. She must, in short, act on the principle of fair 
play by bearing her share of the burdens of social cooperation and impos-
ing no more than a fair share on others. 
Republican theory also contributes to an educated democracy through 
its traditional emphasis on vigilance. As Philip Pettit notes in an essay that 
brings republicanism to bear on issues in criminal law, a vigilant citizenry 
has long been held to be necessary to the health and safety of the body pol-
itic; for "the citizenry should be ever vigilant of public power and be ready 
to contest and challenge it at the slightest suspicion or sign of abuse."36 
To Pettit's observation I would add that the citizens' vigilance ought to 
be aimed not only at those who hold positions of formal authority but 
also at themselves. Citizenship itself is a kind of public office, and failure 
to play fair with one's fellow citizens should count as an abuse of public 
power. An educated democracy is one that takes the task of encouraging 
this kind of civic vigilance seriously. It will look, therefore, to its political, 
legal, and educational institutions-to these and other civic institutions-
to foster a citizenry that is vigilant in maintaining fair play within the 
polity. In particular, to return to a passage of Albert Dzur's quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter, citizens must "be vigilant to the possibility that 
their laws are unfairly burdening some over others."37 Their laws, that is, 
and the forms of punishment that support and follow from them, must 
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respect the principle of fair play, and the citizenry must be self-policing in 
this regard. 
As the evidence of excessive incarceration suggests, the United States is 
not the educated democracy it should be. There is reason, though, to hope 
and work for improvement. Particularly encouraging in this regard are the 
results of a "deliberative poll" on issues in criminal justice that James 
Fishkin and his colleagues conducted in England-results that showed an 
overall shift from simple get-tough-on-crime attitudes toward the more 
flexible and less harsh responses that criminologists tend to favor. 38 If this 
small experiment in educating democracy is truly indicative of what more 
thorough efforts could achieve, then there is reason to believe that penal 
populism need not be a lasting curse of democracy in America. 
Another reason to be hopeful is the simple recognition that there are 
plenty of other democracies in the world, few of which seem to be follow-
ing the United States' example with regard to mass incarceration. In 2006, 
for example, incarceration rates "across the developed world ... ranged 
from 36 per 100,000 (in Iceland) to 737 in the USA, with England and 
Wales, at a rate of 148, ... having one of the highest incarceration rates in 
the EU."39 Exactly how to account for these differences is a matter I must 
leave to social scientists. But there are two points worth noting here, for 
both connect rather directly to fairness. The first is the single-member, 
simple-plurality system of electing representatives to most offices-
national, state, and local-in the United States. This is not only a respect in 
which the United States differs from most other democracies; it also seems 
to be related to higher rates of incarceration than those found in democra-
cies that employ proportional representation.40 The single-member system 
also plays a large part in the artful redistricting that makes representation 
in the United States less than democratic or fair. 41 
The second point to note is that economic inequality in the United 
States is generally greater than in other advanced democracies-and the 
gap between rich and poor continues to grow.42 Whether there is a direct 
connection between economic inequality and mass incarceration is not 
clear. It is clear, however, that the poor in the United States account for 
a disproportionately high percentage of both the victims of crime and of 
those who commit crimes.43 If nothing else, these figures suggest that there 
are likely to be better ways to address the problems of crime-ways that 
speak to the fairness and cooperative nature of the polity-than that of 
locking up as many offenders as possible. 
There is, of course, something paradoxical in taking the existence of 
proportional representation and lesser degrees of economic inequality in 
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other democracies to be a hopeful sign for the United States. There are, 
after all, great obstacles in the way of the adoption of proportional rep-
resentation or a reduction of economic inequality in the United States. 
Nevertheless, they provide focal points for those who would work to edu-
cate democracy in America. They also indicate that the fair-play approach 
has something to contribute to the practice as well as the theory of criminal 
justice. 
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